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The inability to measure the opportunity cost of labor has plagued analyses of firm-level
compensation policies for many years. Using a newly constructed data set of French workers and
firms, we estimate the opportunity cost of the employees' time based on a measure of the person-
effect in the wage equations (derived from Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 1994). We then make
direct calculations of the quasi-rent per worker at each firm and the conditions within that firm's
product market, as measured by international prices, using a representative sample of private
French firms. We find that quasi-rents per worker are only mildly related to the structure of the
French product market. The systematic variation in our quasi-rents is related to international
market prices and work force structure, however, producing an estimate of bargaining power for
the employees of about 0.4. This estimate, while slightly larger than other estimates, may be
quite reasonable for the workers in an economy in which the vast majority of jobs are covered
by industry-level collective bargaining agreements.
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and NBER1.Introduction
This paper considers the determinants of the average annual employment cost per employee in
private French industry. Virtually all jobs in this economy are covered by industry-wide
collective bargaining agreements that set lower bounds for the wage rates that can be paid to
employees (both production and, supervisory) at firms within the industry.' A substantial number
of these jobs are also covered by firm-level agreements (Abowd and Kramarz 1993). In this
c4)ntext, it is natural to try to model the extent to which quasi-rents generated by the firms
through their product market operations are transmitted to the employees through the results of
these negotiations. Such an inquiry must immediately address the question of the opportunity
wage of the employees. Until now, researchers have had to model this opportunity wage without
much insight into the characteristics of the employees at the firm. Using matched longitudinal
data on employees and employers developed by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1994) for a
representative sample of French workers and firms, we are able to get a firm-specific measure of
the opportunity cost of the workers. We use these measures to improve the specification of a
simple "efficient contracts" wage bargaining model in which the quasi-rents per worker are
assumed to originate from the firm's product market operations. Within the context of such a
model, we show that the workers have substantial average bargaining power, about 0.4, whether
or not we include the opportunity cost of fixed capital in the quasi-rent measure.
Section 2 provides a basic model of quasi-rent division. Section 3 describes our data
sources and methods. Section 4 lays out the econometric specification. Section 5discussesthe
results. Finally, we conclude in section 6.
See Margolis (1993) and Abowd and Kramarz (1993) fora fuller description ofthe economicbargaining
environmentin France.2. A Model of Quasi-Rent Division
The models estimated in this paper follow closely those developed in Brown and Ashenfelter
(1986), Abowd (1989), Abowd and Kramarz (1993) andAbowdand Lemieux (1993).2
particular,under strong-form efficient contracting the wage rate is determined by the solution to
the problem:
rnax[Lw+(E—L)x--LxJ'[OF(L,k')—wL_rK] (1)
where F(L,K) is the firm's revenue generating function up to a scalar multiple 0, w is the
negotiated wage rate, x is the opportunity cost of the workers' time, r is the competitive return on
capital with comparable risk, L is the level of employment, L is the maximum level of
employment (members of the negotiating unions), K is the (fixed) capital stock (valued at
current breakup value) and y is the unions' bargaining power. The solution for w is given by:
(9F(L0(x,),A) w—x+ I —x—r I (2)
(L°(x,k') L°(xk))
and the solution for L is given by:
Fi(L0(x,k),) =x (3)•3
As is well-known, the solution given by equations (2) and (3) implies that fully efficient
resource allocation decisions are made with respect to the quantity of labor used and that the
division of the resulting quasi-rent allocates a "pie" that optimally exploits the fixed capital stock
K. Abowd and Kramarz (1993) and Abowd and Lemieux (1993) derive alternative versions of
2
The basic models can be found in Leontif(1948)andMacDonaldandSolow(1981).
Abowd(1989) shows that the same solution arises from present value maximization over horizons determined by
the length of the collective bargaining agreement. The parameter y in that case is interpreted as bargainingpower
over the present value of the quasi.rents.
2equation (2) in which the resulting bargaining outcome does not allocate an optimal quasi-rent
per worker. The optimal value of the quasi-rent per worker appears on the right hand side of their
wage settlement equations; however, the bargaining power parameter has the interpretation of a
lower bound on the bargaining power used to divide the sub-optimal quasi-rent per worker.
Product market conditions enter the solution to the strong form efficient bargain, and the
other bargaining models with the same structure as equation (2), through their effect on the
revenue shifter 0. To model this dependence define the quasi-rent per worker as:




If we let zrepresentproduct market conditions, and other control variables that enter the quasi-
rentper workerequation by virtue of the expression (4),wecan decompose q into a partrelated
toproduct market conditions and an orthogonal component r which we may consider either as
measurement error or as firm-specific factors determining quasi-rents per worker. Our basic
equation for q, then, becomes:
In the pure, cooperative Nash game described by equation (1), the bargaining power
parameter, y, is predetermined. In our empirical specification, we want to allow for the
possibility that bargaining power depends upon the size of the quasi-rent per worker and,
possibly because the outcome is the solution to a noncooperative industry game, upon product
market conditions. Thus we specify y as:
y =y0+y1q+y2z (5)
3If bargaining power is not heterogenous, then y =0 and if noncooperative factors do not enter
the solution then 72 =
3. Sources of Dat2 for Implementing the Model
In this section we describe the firm- and individual-level data that we used to construct our
analysis data set. The basic data on the French firms were derived from two annual surveys of
enterprises: the Béndfices industriels et comrnerciaux (BIC, see INSEE, I 990b) and the Enquete
aur Ia structure de l'emploi (ESE, see INSEE I 990c). The BIC is the basic source for firm level
data used in formulating the national income and product accounts. A research sample, called
the échantillon d'entreprises, of approximately 20,000 firms was created at INSEE as a stratified
random sampling of the BIC universe (see INSEE 1990a). The research sample covers the period
1978 to 1988. The ESE data describe the skill structure of the firms by detailed occupational
categories. Abowd and Kramarz (1993) created a version of these data with the basic BIC
variables and a simple classification of employees by skill groups. We used an updated version
of this analysis file created by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1994, AKMhereafter) that also
included variables computed from the Declaration Annuelle des Salaires (DAS). Thesample is
representative of French private industry. It excludes the government sector and the large
government-owned industrial and transport companies.
Average annual employment (employment at December 31 prior to 1984), Li,, is the
reported average number of salaried and hourly employees (salaries) at the firm over the course
of the calendar year. The average real wage within one of our sample firms,w1,, is defined as the
total wage and benefit bill (frais de personnely.c. charges sociales) divided by the product of
average annual employment and the consumer price index (1980=1.00). Real value addedper
4worker, Vj,,isdefined as value added (valeur ajoutée brut des coUts de facteurs) divided by the
product of average employment and the product shipment price index (1980=1.00). Real assets
per worker, k, is defined as total assets (actif total) divided by the product of average annual
employment and the industry capital price index (1980=1.00).
The measurement of the opportunity cost of time for workers in each firm,Xfi,isbased
upon the analysis of the Declaration Annuelle des Salaires (DAS) performed by AKM. The
analysis sample from the DAS consists of over one million French nongovernmental workers
followed from 1976 to 1987. The longitudinal data identify both the individual and the employer
permitting specification of a model like:
ln(wft) =t + a,+ 4)+x,, + u,, (6)
where w is individual i's annualized wage rate during year t; the effect a, is specific to the
individual, the effect 4)isspecific to the firm given by the function:
J(i, )j employsi in year t
the effect x,, 3 represents time-varying controls in equation (6), j.tisthe grand mean, and the
effect u., represents a statistical error term, orthogonal to all variables on the right-hand side of
equation (6). Given their estimates of the individual and firm effects, AKM construct firm-level
estimates of the average individual effect in the firm:
a('.'}.')—i} (7)
where
AKM atually estimate a more complicated equation than this involving firm-specific seniority slopes; however,
we have aggregated all of their firm effects into the effect 4, in our equation (6).
5N Count({i,t} E{J(i,i)= j})
We use the AKM estimates of a and 4, to construct a measure of the opportunity cost
for the average worker in firm].
=max((i+(a_)+t1IO)ji,xMI,)
whereis the average value of a over firms, 4is the tenth decile of ta,,>inthe population of
firms, j.isthe average real wage in the firm sample, and x, is the value of the industrial
minimum wage in 1980 (25,000FF).
We used all of the variables defined above to create two measures of quasi-rents per
worker. Our first measure corresponds to the one used by Abowd and Lemieux except that we
have a direct measure of material costs, which has been removed from firm production to
calculate value added. Our second measure uses a real opportunity cost of capital of 3% per
annum. The two measures are defmed below:
First definition (QRI):q, E V11 —
(8) Second definition (QR2):q, vj,
—
x, — 0.03k1,
To provide measures of French product market conditions, we constructed sales-based
(chiffres d'affaires) estimates of each firm's market share at the two-digit industry level (NAP
100). To provide measures of world product market conditions we merged export price indices at
the two-digit level for French export classifications (NAP 100) and for US export classifications
(2-digit 1987-based SIC). Table I shows the summary statistics for the firm-level variables used





Annual Real Compensation 86.23 (55.23)
(in thousands 1980FF)
Opportunity Cost of Time 73.11 (59.08)
(in thousands 1980FF)
Quasi-Rent per Worker (1) 34.55 (148.42)
(in thousands 1980FF)
Quasi-Rent per Worker (2) 28.93 (141.26)
(in thousands 1980FF)
Profit per Worker 107.67 (145.96)
(in thousands 1980FF)
Total Assets per Worker 187.38 (732.38)
(in thousands 1980FF)
Market Share 0.0014 (0.02)
(proportion of national market)
Price Index for French Exports 137.90 (66.09)
(1890=100)
Price Index for U.S. Exports 82.131 (12.65)
(1982-84 = 100)
Sources: Declaration Annuelle des Salaires (DAS) and Bénéfices
Industriels et Commerciaux (BIC).
Notes: The sample size is 35568 and the statistics have been
weighted to be representative of firms.
4. Econometric Specification of the Basic Equations
Our wage equations are based upon data for firmj in year t.Therelation connecting wage rates
and quasi-rents per worker as derived from equation (2) above, can be expressed as:
wjg= xj, +y+5 (9)
where Xflisthe firm-specific opportunity cost of the workers' time, q1,isone of the two quasi-
rent measures discussed in section 3, and c,,isa statistical error uncorrelated with either xor
The instrumental equation for quasi-rents per worker is given by:
q,=z,I+rU,. (10)
7where z, is a vector of market structure variables as described in section 3 plus some controls for
the structure of the workforce. The potential heterogeneity in the bargaining power parameter is
modeled as:
y =,'0+y1(q,—)÷y2(z,—i) (11)
where an overbar on the variable indicates its sample average over firms jandyears t.The
parameter y ,asin Abowd and Lemieux, allows for heterogeneous bargaining power as a
f,mction of the size of the quasi-rent per worker while the parameter y2allowsfor heterogeneity
related to product market conditions. Both bargaining power heterogeneity parameters are
constructed so that the basic parameter y may be interpreted as the bargaining power at the
population average 'values of quasi-rents per worker and product market conditions. Substituting
equation (11) into equation (9) yields the basic estimating equation for the wage rate:
=x,÷ 0q, ÷ 1q1(q, _)÷ 1q,1(z, _)+c1, (12)
\Vhen product market conditions do not affect the bargaining power of the parties, the parameter
2iszero and the equation (12) specializes to the form in Abowd and Lemieux (1993):
w, =Xft+y0q11+y1q,(q, —)+€, (13)
There are two empirical issues to consider before considering the direct estimation of
equation (12). First, following Abowd and Lemieux, we will use export prices as a measure of
international product market conditions. Our original plan was to use both US and French export
prices, arguing that French export prices are better adapted to the market definitions used in the
French industries but might be endogenous whereas US export prices, although based on US
sectoral definitions, are genuinely exogenous to the French economy. Table 2 shows that there is
8very little independent variation between the US and French export prices. US export prices do
an excellent job of predicting French export prices (R2 =0.65)with very little prediction bias
(estimated coefficient =1.026).
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Standard Error of Equation 18.06
R2 0.649
Sources: Declaration Annuelie des Salaires (DAS) and Bénétices
Industnels et Commerciaux (BIC)
Notes: Sample size is 35,568. The reported results are least squares
coefficients with standard errors allowing for arbitrary
heteroscedasticity and within industry correlation. The reference
year is 1985. Results are weighted to be representative of firms.
Thesecond statistical issue toconsideris the quality of the reduced form predicting
quasi-rents per worker as a function of the exogenous international and labormarket factors.
10Table 3 reports a simplified reduced form (equation 10) in which the exogenous variables enter
linearly. In the actual structure discussed below, the instruments enter in full quadratic form, as
in Abowd and Leinieux. The results shown in Table 3 do not differ materially from the full
reduced form but are easier to interpret. Notice that both the opportunity cost of time (a direct
component of the quasi-rent measures) and the US export prices are strongly related to the quasi-
rent per worker measures with signs consistent with the theoretical model laid out above. Notice
also that, as in the Abowd and Lemieux Canadian analysis, the reduced form explains only a
small percentage of the variation in measured quasi-rents per worker. We interpret this result as
showing, once again, the importance of using international product market conditions, which are
exogenous to the finns in the analysis, to eliminate excess variability in the measured quasi-rents
per worker.5
We expenmentedwith many differentlag structures andnonhinearitiesfor the relation between international prices
and quasi-rents per worker. In all cases, as in the results shown in the text, we maintained the hypothesis that US
export pt-ices were statistically exogenous. The structure of the relation between the international prices and the
quasi-rents was essentially the same as in the simple specification. We elected to report only the simplest
specificatIons. The equations do not change if French export prices are also introduced as an exogenous variable,
although these prices are not always statistically exogenous.
11able 3
Form Estimates for the
per Worker
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5. Quasi-Rent Division in French Firms
Table 4 summarizes the results for both of our quasi-rentperworker definitions. In this table we
note that the estimate of the average worker bargaining power in the French economy (y,the
coefficient on quasi-rent per worker variable) is about 0.2 in the straightforward least squares
specification for either quasi-rent definition.6 The least squares estimates indicate that
bargaining power is not a flmction of quasi-rents per worker (y= 0) or,when capital costs are
included in the quasi-rent measure, that this relation is very weak. Hausman-Wu tests, however,
do not support the exogeneity of the quasi-rent per worker measures. Hence, we prefer our IV
6
The estimated effect is somewhat smaller if this specification is augmented with unrestricted industry effects.
Because of difficulties in computing the robust standard errors when all industry effects are included in the model,
we have hot displayed those results. The results presented in Table 4 are similar in both magnitude and precision to
results of other specifications that involve unrestricted time and industry effects.
12estimates, which indicate that the average bargaining power is on the order of 0.37 (no capital
costs in the quasi-rent measure) to 0.45 (including capital's opportunity cost in the quasi-rent per
worker measure). There is clear evidence of bargaining power heterogeneity in the IV estimates
since the coefficients on the quasi-rent quadratic term are all positive and significant. There is
also clear evidence of product market importance in determining the bargaining power since the
interaction of the market structure variable with the quasi-rent per worker is significant in both
definitions.
Table4
Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Compensation per
WorkerAs a Function of Quasi-RentsperWorker and Market Structure
Method: ULS IV
Quasi-Rent perQuasi-Rent per Quasi-Rent perQuasi-Rent per
M Worker, no Worker, including Worker, no Worker, including Quasi-Rent easure.
OpportunityCostOpporunity Cost of Opportunity Cost Opporunity Cost 01
of Capital Capital of Capital Capital
Intercept 54.859 54.576 25.982 21.047
(3.021) (2.483) (8.221) (8.285)
Opportunity Cost of Time 0.330 0.344 0.554 0.632
(0.025) (0.022) (0.151) (0.127)
Quasi-Rent per Worker 0.194 0.202 0.367 0.452
(0.026) (0.023) (0.103) (0.094)
Quasi-Rent per Worker 0.004 0.007 0.102 0.096
(quadratic term, see notes) (0.004) (0.003) (0.041) (0.035)
Market Share xlOO 3.197 3.121 34.312 26.614
(0.993) (0.889) (66.226) (59.267)
Quasi-Rent, Market Share -1.572 -1.601 -63.112 -63.176
(interaction, see notes) (0.609) (0.538) (34.133) (30.753)
Standard Error of Equation 20.82 20.93 — —
R2 0.332 0.325 — —
Sources: Oéclaration Annuelle des Salaires (DAS) and Bénéfices Industheis et Commerciaux (BIC).
Notes: Sample size is 35,568. The reported results are least squares coefficients with standard errors allowing
for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and within industry correlation. Results are weighted to be representative of
firms. The quadratic term in the equations is the product of the quasi-rent measure and the same measure
deviated from its mean. The quasi-rent, market share interaction is the product of the quasi-rent measure and
the deviation of market share from its mean. The instruments indude year effects, the opportunity cost of time,
its square, US export prices, its square, and the interaction of opportunity cost of time and export prices.
136. Conclusion
We have demonstrated that although the relation between firm-level quasi-rents perworkerand
the productmarket conditionswe measure is not strong, the systematic part of that relation is
statistically important in explaining firm-level heterogeneity in average compensation per
employee. We have further demonstrated that firm-specific measures of the opportunity cost of
time permit the specification and estimation of the structure of strong form bargaining models in
a manner that avoids many earlier problems. For our sample of French firms, average employee
bargaining power is large, about 0.4 whether or not we allow for an opportunity cost to fixed
capital. This is perhaps not surprising in an economy where the vast majority ofjobs are covered
by industry-level collective bargaining agreements and more than one-third by an additional
firm-level agreement. In our preferred specification, worker bargaining power increases as the
quasi-rent per worker increases and decreases as the firm's market share increases.
The analysis using French workers and firms is fully consistent with the analysis using
Canadian workers and firms in Abowd and Lemieux. The similarity of the two sets of
compensation analyses suggests that the use of international market prices to extract the
component of quasi-rents per worker that underlies the bargaining model discussed above is a
useful and statistically valid method of modeling the product market determinants of
compensation outcomes.
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